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Abstract

In this paper we present new evidence of cross-border shopping in response to sales
taxation. While several instructive studies provide estimates of the cross-border shopping
effect, we utilize a unique opportunity to evaluate the effect of a large discrete change in
sales tax policy. Using county level data on food income and sales tax data for West
Virginia over the 1982-2000 period we estimate that for every one-percentage point
increase in the county relative price ratio due to sales tax change, the per capita food
income decreases by about 0.7 percent. Our estimates indicate that food sales fell in
West Virginia border counties by about 4 percent as a result of the imposition of the 6
percent sales tax on food in 1989.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we take advantage of a unique opportunity to reevaluate the role of
sales taxation on cross-border shopping using county level food store data for West
Virginia over the 1982-2000 period. During the 1980-82 period, West Virginia
legislators eliminated the sales tax on food by cutting the rate on food from 3 percent by
1 percentage point per year. Then in 1989 legislators reintroduced the taxation of food,
but at a rate of 6 percent. As illustrated in Figure 1, West Virginia’s neighboring states
(Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) either exempt food from sales
taxation, or in the case of Virginia tax food at a reduced rate. In total, there are currently
20 states that impose state and/or local sales tax on food products. Residents in West
Virginia border counties experienced a significant shift in the after-tax price differential
with neighboring states for food products. The reintroduction of the 6 percent sales tax
on food in 1989 provides an opportunity to evaluate the impact of this large discrete
change in sales tax policy on the food store industry in border counties relative to interior
counties. This is relevant particularly due to recent proposals in West Virginia to
eliminate or cut the sales tax on food purchases.
In recent years there has been a renewed interest in the role of sales taxation in
consumption activity, and in particular the effect of sales taxation on shopping location
decisions. At the state and local level, the proliferation of Internet shopping is eroding
the tax base. State and local governments cannot require firms with no physical presence
(or nexus) in the taxing jurisdiction to collect sales and use taxes. Thus, just as there is
potential for consumers to avoid sales taxation by making purchases in a nearby lower tax
jurisdiction, there is also potential for consumers to avoid sales taxation by making
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purchases online. Although the limited empirical evidence shows that Internet purchases
are sensitive to sales taxation (Goolsbee, 2000), difficulty in obtaining location-specific
data on Internet sales has hampered this line of research. At the federal level, there is
some discussion of the possibility of replacing the income tax with a broad-based
consumption tax. Also, in Europe policies that have increased both consumer and factor
mobility have generated a new interest in tax harmonization in order to avoid distortions
that may exist as a result of tax policy.1 For all these reasons, policymakers at the
federal, state and local levels in the United States as well as in Europe and elsewhere are
looking to the literature for guidance. While several studies provide valuable empirical
evidence on the degree of cross-border shopping in response to sales tax differentials,2
our paper provides new evidence of the magnitude of the cross border shopping effect.
To preview the paper’s results, our empirical analysis reveals a strong response to
the application of the six percent sales tax on food: For every one percentage point
increase in the county relative price ratio due to sales tax changes, the per capita food
income decreases by about 0.7 percent. The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. The next section provides a brief review of the literature and outlines the
theoretical construct used to guide our empirical analysis. In section 3, we present the
data, our empirical methodology, and results. Section 4 concludes.
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Discussion
There are a number of studies from the U.S. that examine the relationship
between state and local taxes and cross-border sales. However, given the integration
efforts in the European Union, it is also important to cite research on cross-border
1

See Tanzi (1995), Dhillon (2001), Peralta and van Ypersele (2002), and Neumann, Holman, and Alm
(2002) for excellent discussions and an overview of the tax coordination literature.
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We provide a review of this literature in the next section.
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shopping in Europe. Specifically, FitzGerald (1992) found evidence of tax-induced
cross-border shopping between Ireland and the United Kingdom. Also, a study by
Gordon and Nelson (1997) provided evidence of cross-border shopping in Denmark.
Ohsawa (2003) contributed to the EU tax harmonization literature by showing in a
theoretical model that narrowing the tax band across countries lowers the number of
cross-border shoppers.
In North America excise taxation, lotteries and cross-border sales have been
popular research topics in recent years. Ferris (2001) showed that heavy taxation of sin
products in Canada played an important role in drastic changes in cross-border shopping
between 1989 and 1994. Beard, Gant and Saba (1997) found that cross-border sales of
beer and liquor are significant in at least some U.S. states. They argued that these crossborder sales might change the demand elasticities to the extent that the revenue
generating capabilities of state governments are affected. Similarly, Nelson (2002)
concluded that the size of potential cross-border markets is an important determinant of
state excise tax policy in the U.S. Tosun and Skidmore (2004) and Garrett and Marsh
(2002) analyzed the border effects of state lotteries. Garrett and Marsh (2002) provided
evidence that cross-border lottery shopping had a significant net negative impact on state
lottery revenues in Kansas, Similarly, Tosun and Skidmore (2004) showed that lottery
and lottery game introductions in neighboring states have had a significant impact on
lottery revenues in West Virginia border counties. In another paper, Skidmore and Tosun
(2005) also provided evidence that cross-border effects from interstate lottery
competition may have a significant impact on retail activity in counties that are at the
border.

3

In the context of sales taxation and Internet shopping, Goolsbee (2000) evaluated
the relationship between sales tax rates and Internet purchases, using data from Forrester
Research (a marketing research company). He found that local sales taxation is an
important determinant of Internet purchases. However, a limitation of his work is that he
does not know precisely the city or county of residence for the consumer, and thus the tax
rate variable used by Goolsbee may contain measurement error.
Most closely related to the present paper is the work of Walsh and Jones (1988)
who examined the effect of the elimination of the 3 percent sales tax on food in West
Virginia during the 1980-82 period.3 In particular, they measured how West Virginia
consumers in border counties who had been shopping outside of West Virginia to avoid
the sales tax on food stopped shopping elsewhere as the tax was phased out. In contrast,
in our analysis we measure the degree to which West Virginia consumers in border
counties began shopping in neighboring states as the sales tax on food was reintroduced
in West Virginia but at twice the rate.
While this previous work is useful in understanding the border tax issue, the work
in the present paper makes several contributions. First, much of the previous work has
relied on the cross-sectional variation in taxes and retail sales, whereas we evaluate the
issue in a dynamic framework by utilizing a panel of West Virginia counties over a
nineteen-year period. Second, the previous research that utilized panel data (as opposed
to cross-sectional data) evaluated marginal changes in sales tax rates of, say, 1, 2, or 3
percent. Given the presence of travel costs, many consumers might not be responsive to
these small changes. In contrast, we examine the response to a large and discrete 6
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Walsh and Jones (1988) provide an extensive review of the U.S. studies on sales taxation and cross border
shopping.
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percent increase in the sales tax rate, so that the tax savings are likely to outweigh travel
costs for a larger number of consumers. Third, most studies have utilized data on general
retail activity. We, just as Walsh and Jones (1988) did, focus on one industry—food
purchased for home consumption. Lastly, none of the previous studies on taxation and
cross border shopping address the potential bias that can be introduced from spatial lag or
spatial error issues. Given the spatial nature of cross border shopping, this may
potentially lead to bias, inefficiency, and/or inconsistency in the estimates.
The theoretical framework we use follows the simple model presented in Walsh
and Jones (1988) and is similar to that which was used in earlier work of Fisher (1980)
and Fox (1986). Per capita demand for grocery products in county i at time period t
depends on per capita income (Yit), the after-tax price of food items in the county relative
to that available in other nearby locations (Pit), and the cost of travel associated with
obtaining goods in other locations (Cit). This relationship is illustrated in the following
multiplicative demand model:
a b c
Sit = AY
i it Pit Ci

(1)

Sit is per capita sales of taxable food items demanded in county i at time t, Yit is per
capita income, and Pit is defined as,

pit (1 + Tit )

pat (1 + Tat )

where Tit is the home state tax rate as

applied to grocery food, Tat is the sales tax rate applied to grocery food sales in the
nearest county in the adjacent state, and pit, pat are home and adjacent state pre-tax prices,
which are assumed to be equal as in Walsh and Jones (1988). Ci and Ai represent costs of
travel from county i to the nearest commercial center in the adjacent state and a
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multiplicative factor that is unique to each county. Ci and Ai are constant over time so
that they will be controlled for with county fixed effects.
We expect an inverse relationship between food sales and the after-tax price
differential because consumers may find it worthwhile to travel to the lower tax
jurisdiction to make purchases. As highlighted in Walsh and Jones (1988), in order for us
to attribute any changes in grocery sales with changes in sales taxation we must assume
that input costs are similar on each side of the border, and that long-run supply curves are
flat (i.e., constant cost structures); assumptions that are typical in this line of research.
Nevertheless, we also control for several economic and demographic factors that may
also determine food sales but are not explicitly modeled here—these variables are
discussed in the next section.
The literature review and theoretical discussion presented above suggests that
border county grocery sales are likely to decrease with the introduction of the sales tax on
food. To set the stage for our more in-depth analysis, we present some prima facia
evidence of a “border tax” effect. Using data on per capita food income4 we conduct a
difference-in-differences analysis. As shown in Table 1, average per capita food income
in West Virginia interior counties was about $3.29 cents larger in the post-1989 period.
But for West Virginia border counties the post 1989 period logged a reduction in per
capita income of $6.97. The difference between the change in per capita food income for
border counties versus interior counties is therefore ($10.26). Without controlling for
other factors that determine changes in food sector income, this analysis suggests that the
imposition of the sales tax on food in 1989 may have had a significant impact on the food
4

Ideally, data on food sales would be the most appropriate measure. However, food sales data are not
available annually by county for the period of analysis. We therefore proxy food sales with food income.
As described in detail in the next section, food income is an excellent proxy for food sales.
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industry in border counties. In the next section, we conduct a more thorough empirical
analysis to determine that magnitude of the “border tax” effect.
3. Empirical Analysis
As outlined in Section II, the food sales (or income) variable is modeled to be a
function of per capita income (Yit), the after-tax price of food items in the county relative
to that available in other nearby locations (Pit), and the cost of travel associated with
obtaining goods in other locations (Cit). In this section we describe in detail the data we
use, the empirical methodology and the estimation results. We begin with a detailed
explanation of the data set we employ.
3.1 Data
Ideally, we would like to measure the effect of the sales tax on food sales, but to
our knowledge annual county level data on food sales is not available over the entire
period of analysis. However, data on food store income5 is available on an annual basis.
Is food store income an effective proxy for food store sales? To answer this question, we
collected county level data from the United States Census Bureau on food store sales for
years 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997 and matched these data with data on food store
income. The correlation between food store income and food store sales was 0.99. We
also regressed food store income on food store sales. The estimated parameter values
(with absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses) are reported in the equation below.

Food Store Income = − 468.3 + 0.16 Food Store Sales
(83.0)
Adj. R 2 = 0.97 N = 193

5

Food store income is defined as all income earned in the food stores (SIC code 623) within the retail
sector as provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Figure 2 presents a simple plot of these two measures of food store activity, which
shows an almost perfectly linear relationship between the two variables. From this
analysis, we conclude that food store income is an excellent proxy for food store sales.
Summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 2. We
now turn our attention to several important econometric issues.
3.2 Methodology
The data are a panel of 1045 observations6 that include all counties for years 1982
through 2000. Given that our data have both time series and cross-sectional components,
our analysis relies on changes in the status of the sales on tax on food in West Virginia.
The analysis is simplified by the fact that West Virginia’s contiguous states did not
experience a change in the sales tax status during the period of analysis. Given the panel
nature of our data, our analysis employs panel estimation techniques. Two conventional
approaches for estimating panel data are the fixed-effects and random-effects procedures.
In this case, if the individual county fixed-effects are correlated with other exogenous
variables, the random-effects estimation procedure yields inconsistent estimates. We
start with an F-test for the joint significance of the dummies that form the fixed effects.
The null hypothesis, which says that fixed-effect dummies are “not significant”, is
resoundingly rejected.7 In addition, a Hausman test shows that the fixed county-effects
are correlated with the other exogenous variables, which suggests that the fixed-effects
estimation procedure is more appropriate for this analysis. On a theoretical basis, a fixedeffects technique is more appropriate because the data are a panel of all counties in West
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The panel is unbalanced due to 20 missing observations on food income from the Bureau of Economic
Analyis.
7
See Baltagi (2001: 14) for the specifics of this test.
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Virginia and not a sampling of counties.8 Therefore, for both theoretical and empirical
reasons, we begin our econometric analyis by using the two way fixed-effects procedure
as illustrated in equation (2). Denote Foodit as the natural logarithm of deflated county
per capita income earned in food industry (our proxy for food sales) in county i in period
t. We assume that

Foodit = Pit β1 + X it β 2 + Ci + Tt + ε it ,

(2)

where Pit is the after-tax price of food items in the county relative to that available in
other nearby locations for county i in period t, Xit is an nxm vector control variables (m is
the number of controls) and where β2 represents an mx1 vector of coefficients. Included
in Xit are the natural logarithm of real per capita income net of retail income (Per Capita
Non-Food Income), the unemployment rate (Unemployment Rate), the proportion of the
population that is over the age of 65 (Elderly), male (Male), and nonwhite (Minority). Ci
represents the county specific effects which control for, among other things, travel costs,
Tt is the set of time indicator variables, and εit is the residual which, as discussed below,
we treat as either independently and normally distributed (OLS procedure), serially
correlated (AR1 procedure), or spatially correlated (spatial error and spatial lag
procedures) .
We estimate another specification in which we measure the effect of the after-taxprice ratio (P) on food income in each of the five bi-state regions (Kentucky, Maryland,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) by interacting a series of indicator variables that equal
one if the county borders a particular state and zero otherwise, with P. We also use a less
specific measure of the effect of the introduction of the sales tax on food. In this
8

Baltagi (2001) argues that random effects model is more appropriate when a random sample is chosen
from a large population. Here, we have the entire set of counties.
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specification we replace P with an interaction term between an indicator variable that is
equal to one if the county is a border county and zero otherwise, and indicator variable
that is equal to one for years 1989 and on (the years during which the 6 percent tax was
imposed on food) and zero otherwise. In the last specification we examine the effects of
the newly imposed sales tax on food with the indicator variable approach for each of the
five bi-state regions.
Empirical analysis in a spatial context often focuses on factors such as distance,
size of retail center, transportation routes, and the like. However, in this analysis, these
variables change little over time so that fixed effects largely control for these factors.
This allows us to focus on other variables that change over time such as income,
demographic characteristics and, our primary interest, the changing tax environment.
One approach to estimating the two-way fixed-effects model is to include a set of county
and time indicator variables in the specification. The fixed-effects estimator uses a
weighted average of the within county variation and the between county variation net of
statewide trends to form the parameter estimates.
As we mentioned in the introduction, spatial autocorrelation can be a potential
concern. With the exception of Case (1991, 1992), Case, et al. (1993), Ohsawa (1999),
Garrett and Marsh (2002), and Tosun and Skidmore (2004), use of models of spatial
dependence has been limited in the public finance arena. First introduced by Cliff and
Ord (1981) and Anselin (1988), models of spatial dependence account for any direct
influence of spatial neighbors, spillover effects, and externalities generated between
cross-sectional observations (in this research the unit of observation is counties). Failing
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to address spatial dependence may lead to biased, inefficient, and/or inconsistent
coefficient estimates.
Spatial dependence is caused by the existence of spillover effects between units of
observation (counties) and the presence of a direct influence from activity in one county
retail activity in neighboring counties. For example, changes in the number of retail
establishments, changes in income, etc… in one county could affect retail activity in
another county. The spatial relationship may affect the estimation in two ways. First,
food retail activity in one county may affect food retail activity in a neighboring county;
this is referred to as a spatial lag or spatial autoregressive relationship. Second, the error
term for county (i) may be correlated with error term for county (j), where the degree of
correlation depends on the distance between counties. In this study, we assume that
adjacent county error terms are correlated but the error terms of counties not contiguous
to one another are uncorrelated.
To control for the spatial lag issue, and additional term is added to equation (2).
With the addition of the spatial lag term, equation (2) can be rewritten as

Food it = ρW1 Food it −1 + Pit β 1 + X it β 2 + C i + Tt + ε it ,

(3)

Where ρ indicates whether or not counties are contiguous to one another and therefore
exhibit a spatial autoregressive relationship.
The degree of spatial autocorrelation depends on the potential correlation across
counties in the error term. Any changes in the food retail market not captured by the
regressors will be captured by the error term for each of the counties. We address this
spatial correlation by using a spatial error model wherein the error term is written as

ε it = λW2 ε it + µ it
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where

ε it is the vector of errors for all counties
λ is the residual spatial autocorrelation coefficient,
W 2 is a symmetric spatial error weighting matrix,

and

µ it is an independently and normally distributed error term with constant
variance.
The spatial weighting matrix specifies the degree of correlation across counties.
Here we assume that the error terms in adjacent counties are correlated so that a one is
denoted in the those diagonals, and that the error terms in counties not contiguous to one
another are uncorrelated so that a zero is denoted in all other diagonals.
For more detail on the econometric issues involved in addressing spatial
dependence in panel data analysis, we refer readers to Elhorst (2003). Elhorst (2003)
explains in detail both the fixed effects spatial error and spatial lag models.9
Garrett and Marsh (2002) use cross-sectional variation lottery sales to generate
the parameter estimates, and thus spatial dependence is critical to their analysis. In our
analysis, we use panel data so that the parameter estimates are generated primarily from
the within county variation in food sales. In this context serial correlation of error is
likely a more serious concern. In the next section, we report the OLS fixed effects
estimation, a fixed effects estimation that corrects for serial correlation of the error, and a
fixed effects estimation that corrects for spatial autocorrelation.
3.3 Results
9

We used MATLAB routines of spatial error model (SEM) and spatial lag model (SAR) which can be
downloaded from the web site www.spatial-econometrics.com.

12

Fixed Effects Estimates
Table 4 contains estimates using the fixed effects procedure without controlling
for serial correlation of error—the same procedure used by Walsh and Jones (1988).
However, to demonstrate the robustness of our results, in Table 5 we present another set
of regressions in which we correct for serial correlation, and in Table 6 estimate a set of
regression in which we correct for spatial autocorrelation.
In Table 4 we present four regressions that measure the effects of the West
Virginia sales tax on food income in border counties. In column 1 we present a
regression that includes our control variables and the interaction between the West
Virginia border dummy variable and the post-1989 dummy variable. The coefficient on
this interaction term is negative and significant. Per capita food income decreased by
approximately 5 percent more in border counties (relative to interior counties) in the
years following the imposition of the sales tax on food.10 In column 2 we examine the
effect in each of the five bi-state regions by including five interaction terms (the dummy
variable for those counties that border particular neighbor state interacted with the post1989 dummy variable). In three of the five bi-state regions (Ohio, Kentucky and Virginia
borders) we observe reductions in food income in border counties relative to interior
counties with the greatest reduction in counties that border Kentucky (16%).
Surprisingly, the coefficient estimate for the Pennsylvania region is positive and
statistically significant which indicates a 5.9% increase in per capita food income in the
post-1989 period. One explanation to this could be the growing attractiveness of the
Morgantown metro area for job opportunities in this period that may have led to more
10

Here and in all other dummy variable coefficient interpretations, percentage change in per capita food

(

γ

)

income is calculated using the formula, e − 1 * 100 , where
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γ

is the coefficient of the dummy variable.

people from neighboring states (particularly bordering Pennsylvania) commuting to this
area for day jobs. This could explain expanded food store activity despite the 6% sales
tax on food purchases. Columns 3 and 4 present more precise estimates of the “border
tax” effect. Column 3 includes the after-tax price of food items in the county relative to
that available in other nearby locations. This variable is negative and significant at the 1
percent level, indicating that a 1 percentage point increase in the after tax price would
reduce per capita food income by about 0.9%. This estimate indicates that a 6
percentage-point increase in the sales tax rate that occurred in 1989 reduced food income
by about 5.4% in border counties, relative to interior counties. Column 4 shows again
that in three of the five bi-state regions (again Ohio, Kentucky and Virginia borders) we
observe negative effects of the sales tax on food income with the largest effect in counties
that border Kentucky (2.9% decrease for a 1% increase in county relative price ratio).
These border effects make sense when we consider the population base in these bi-state
regions. For example, Huntington Metropolitan Statistical Area, which includes six
border counties from West Virginia, Ohio and Kentucky, is the largest MSA in terms of
population base in West Virginia.11 In addition, the significant result for the Virginia
border region is particularly important since Virginia is the only neighboring state that
has taxed food purchases throughout our study period. West Virginia’s imposition of
sales tax on food purchases in 1989 decreased the tax difference between two states,
which also diminished the tax incentives for Virginia residents at the West Virginia
border to shop for food in West Virginia. The exceptions to the regions that we see
significant border effects are the counties that border Maryland (a statistically
insignificant coefficient) and Pennsylvania (again unexpectedly yields a positive and
11

See Hammond (2001) for a comparison of West Virginia’s MSAs.
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significant coefficient). Generally, we find, just as Walsh and Jones did, strong border
tax effects.
We also briefly report the coefficient estimates on the control variables. With the
exception of per capita non-food personal income and the percentage of population over
the age of 65, none of the control variables are statistically significant. The proportion of
the population over the age of 65 is significant: A 10 point increase in the proportion of
the population over the age of 65 reduces per capita food by between 0.2% and 0.3%.
Given that the elderly population spends a greater portion of their income on services
such as health care and that this demographic group is less likely to have children in the
home, this result is not surprising. Somewhat surprisingly we obtain a negative and
statistically significant coefficient estimate for the non-food personal income, although
this coefficient loses its significance once we control for serial correlation.
Estimates with Correction for Serial Correlation of Errors
Given that the Durbin-Watson test indicated the existence of serial correlation of
error, we also present for comparison fixed effects estimates with a correction for serial
correlation using an AR1 procedure. As presented in Table 5, we see that the coefficient
estimates become smaller in magnitude and statistical significance is lost for some of the
variables. Two variables that show the overall border effects WVBorder*Post-1989 and
County Relative Price Ratio in columns (1) and (3) are still significant albeit with
somewhat smaller coefficient estimates. However, with the exception of the Kentucky
border region (WVBorderKY*Post-1989), the border effects variables for the bi-state
regions lost their significance. As for the control variables, per capita non-food income is
no longer significant whereas the proportion of population over 65 is still significant with
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roughly an unchanged coefficient estimate. Results in Table 5 show that while evidence
of overall border effects is fairly robust, the correction for serial correlation weakens the
results from the five bi-state region estimates.
Spatial Error Model Estimates
In a final set of regressions as reported in Table 6, we use the spatial error model.
Note first that λ is not significant, indicating no evidence of correlation of errors across
adjacent counties. While we present these estimates for comparison, given that we find
no evidence of spatial autocorrelation we favor the results found in Tables 4 and 5. Even
so the results in Table 6 are similar to the results in Tables 4 and 5, except that the overall
measures of tax price becomes insignificant. However, the significance remains for two
of the five bi-state regions (Kentucky and Virginia). Again, the tax price variables for the
Pennsylvania bi-state region is unexpectedly positive and significant. We also estimated
the same series of regressions using a spatial lag estimation procedure. However, we
found no evidence of spatial autoregression and thus do not report them here.12
Based on this analysis, we believe the estimates found in Table 5 are most
reliable. However, the alternative estimation techniques generally show that our findings
are reasonably robust.
4. Policy Implications and Conclusions
In this paper we present new evidence of cross-border shopping in response to
sales taxation. While several instructive studies provide estimates of the cross-border
shopping effect, we add to this literature by utilizing a unique opportunity to evaluate the
effect of a large discrete change in sales tax policy. Using county level data on food
income and sales tax data for West Virginia over the 1982-2000 period we estimate that
12

These estimates are available from the authors upon request.
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for every one-percentage point increase in the county relative price ratio due to sales tax
change, the per capita food income decreases by about 0.7 percent. Our estimates
indicate that food sales fell in West Virginia border counties by about 4 percent as a
result of the imposition of the 6 percent sales tax on food in 1989. Hence, our results
confirm those found in Walsh and Jones (1988).
Using the border effect estimate from column (3) of Table 5, our results indicate
that, on average, the imposition of the 6 percent sales tax on food reduced food income in
West Virginia border counties by about $69 million during the period 1990-2000 or $6.3
million annually after 1989. We also show that West Virginia counties at the Kentucky,
Ohio and Virginia borders might have had significant negative cross-border sales impact
from the sales tax on food with relatively weaker evidence for counties at the Ohio and
Virginia borders. According to estimates in column (4) of Table 5, the annual economic
impact after 1989 for the only bi-state region that exhibited statistically significant border
effect was -$1.4 million for West Virginia counties bordering Kentucky. The total
economic impact for these counties was -$15.8 million for the period 1990-2000. Our
analysis suggests that one should approach the border effects results with caution: The
correction for serial correlation of errors weakens the border effects estimates. More
importantly, these effects are not borne out in most of the five bi-state border regions.
Generally, these results confirm the findings of previous work on taxation and
border shopping. Our findings suggest that policymakers do well to consider carefully
the tax structure in neighboring jurisdictions, and that tax harmonization efforts could
lead to significant efficiency gains. In the case of West Virginia, the imposition of the
sales tax on food resulted in a significant outflow of expenditures in border--$6.3 million

17

annually. It may be that in the end the benefits of imposing the sales tax on food
outweighed the costs, but information presented here and in the previous literature helps
decision makers to make that assessment.
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Figure 1: Sales Tax Treatment of Food Products in the U.S. (as of January 1, 2005)
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Source: Federation of Tax Administrators. http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/sales.html
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Figure 2: Plot of Retail Income and Retail Sales
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Table 1.

Difference-in-Differencesa

Real Per Capita Income in Food Stores Sector
Pre-1989 Post-1989
Difference
Border
West
Counties
Virginia
County Interior
Counties

200.29
(3.76)

193.32
(3.32)

-6.97
(5.04)

217.51
(4.21)

220.80
(4.86)

3.29
(6.86)
-10.26
(8.33)

a

Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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Table 2.

Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Analysis
Observations

Mean

1025
206.586
1045
0.316
1045
0.126
1045
0.021
1045
0.137
1045
0.084
1045
0.074
1045
1.012
1045
0.226
1045
0.037
1045
0.236
1045
0.149
1045
0.132
1025 16,093.070
1045
11.736
1045
14.642
1045
48.610
1045
2.393
1045
0.545
1045
0.579

Per Capita Income of Food Stores
WVBorder*Post-1989
WVBorderOH*Post-1989
WVBorderKY*Post-1989
WVBorderVA*Post-1989
WVBorderMD*Post-1989
WVBorderPA*Post-1989
County Relative Price Ratio
PriceRatio* WVBorderOH
PriceRatio* WVBorderKY
PriceRatio* WVBorderVA
PriceRatio* WVBorderMD
PriceRatio* WVBorderPA
Per Capita Non-Food Personal Income
Unemployment Rate
Proportion of Population Over the Age of 65
Proportion of the Population That Is Male
Proportion of the Population That is Nonwhite
WV Border County
Post-1989
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Standard
Deviations
66.193
0.465
0.332
0.144
0.344
0.278
0.261
0.027
0.428
0.192
0.425
0.361
0.345
3,297.329
5.216
2.147
0.981
2.736
0.498
0.494

Table 3.
Variables
Per Capita Income of Food
Stores
WVBorder*Post-1989
WVBorderOH*Post-1989
WVBorderKY*Post-1989
WVBorderVA*Post-1989
WVBorderMD*Post-1989
WVBorderPA*Post-1989
County Relative
Price Ratio
PriceRatio* WVBorderOH
PriceRatio* WVBorderKY
PriceRatio* WVBorderVA
PriceRatio* WVBorderMD
PriceRatio* WVBorderPA
Per Capita Non-Food Personal
Income
Unemployment
Rate
Proportion of Population Over
the Age of 65
Proportion of the Population
That Is Male
Proportion of the Population
That is Nonwhite
WV Border
County
Post-1989

Definitions and Sources of Variables
Definitions
Real per capita private income in food stores sector

Source
BEA

Indicator variable equal to 1 for a West Virginia border county
and for the period 1990-2000 and 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 for a WV County at Ohio border
and for the period 1990-2000 and 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 for a WV County at Kentucky
border and for the period 1990-2000 and 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 for a WV County at Virginia
border and for the period 1990-2000 and 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 for a WV County at Maryland
border and for the period 1990-2000 and 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 for a WV County at Pennsylvania
border and for the period 1990-2000 and 0 otherwise
Ratio of after-tax price in a West Virginia county to the aftertax price in a neighboring county
County Relative Price Ratio for a West Virginia County that
borders Ohio
County Relative Price Ratio for a West Virginia County that
borders Kentucky
County Relative Price Ratio for a West Virginia County that
borders Virginia
County Relative Price Ratio for a West Virginia County that
borders Maryland
County Relative Price Ratio for a West Virginia County that
borders Pennsylvania
Real per capita personal income net of non-food stores income

TS

ACIR, CCH

Percentage county unemployment rate

WVBEP

Percentage Share of People Aged 65 and Over in Total
County Population
Percentage Share of Male Population in Total County
Population
Percentage Share of Nonwhite Population in Total County
Population
Indicator variable equal to 1 if it’s a West Virginia border
county and 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 for the period 1990-2000 and 0
otherwise

CENSUS

TS
TS
TS
TS
TS

TS
TS
TS
TS
TS
BEA

CENSUS
CENSUS
TS
TS

Sources:
BEA: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Accounts Data: http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/reis/
TS: Tosun and Skidmore – variables created by the authors.
ACIR: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations – Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, various
years.
CCH: Commerce Clearing House, Incorporated: http://tax.cchgroup.com
WVBEP: West Virginia Bureau of Employment Programs: http://www.wvbep.org/scripts/bep/lmi/cntydata.cfm
CENSUS: U.S. Census Bureau, County Population Estimates: http://eire.census.gov/popest/estimates.php
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Table 4. Estimation Resultsa
(with county and year fixed effects)
Variable
WVBorder*Post-1989

(1)
-0.051***
(0.016)

(2)

WVBorderOH*Post-1989

-0.041*
(0.024)

WVBorderKY*Post-1989

-0.175***
(0.048)

WVBorderVA*Post-1989

-0.063***
(0.018)

WVBorderMD*Post-1989

-0.008
(0.023)

WVBorderPA*Post-1989

0.057**
(0.023)

(3)

(4)

-0.896***
(0.277)

County Relative Price Ratio
PriceRatio* WVBorderOH

-0.691*
(0.391)

PriceRatio* WVBorderKY

-2.895***
(0.818)

PriceRatio* WVBorderVA

-1.155***
(0.323)

PriceRatio* WVBorderMD

-0.157
(0.398)

PriceRatio* WVBorderPA

0.957**
(0.392)
-0.293***
(0.105)

-0.259**
(0.106)

-0.295***
(0.105)

-0.260**
(0.106)

0.001
(0.002)

0.001
(0.002)

0.001
(0.002)

0.001
(0.002)

-0.022***
(0.008)

-0.029***
(0.009)

-0.022***
(0.008)

-0.029***
(0.009)

Proportion of the Population That Is Male

0.009
(0.020)

-0.004
(0.019)

-0.009
(0.020)

-0.004
(0.019)

Proportion of the Population That is Nonwhite

-0.002
(0.017)

-0.014
(0.017)

-0.001
(0.017)

-0.015
(0.017)

7.757***
(1.433)
0.88
1025

8.189***
(1.382)
0.89
1025

7.769***
(1.434)
0.89
1025

8.183***
(1.383)

Per Capita Non-Food Personal Income
Unemployment Rate
Proportion of Population Over the Age of 65

Constant
R2:
Sample size:
a
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*
Indicate 10 percent significance level.
**
Indicate 5 percent significance levels.
***
Indicate 1 percent significance levels.
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0.89
1025

Table 5. Estimation Resultsa
(two-way fixed effects AR1 regression)
Variable
WVBorder*Post-1989

(1)
-0.039*
(0.022)

(2)

WVBorderOH*Post-1989

-0.024
(0.032)

WVBorderKY*Post-1989

-0.145**
(0.060)

WVBorderVA*Post-1989

-0.018
(0.028)

WVBorderMD*Post-1989

-0.046
(0.033)

WVBorderPA*Post-1989

0.010
(0.037)

(3)

(4)

-0.664*
(0.380)

County Relative Price Ratio
PriceRatio* WVBorderOH

-0.402
(0.526)

PriceRatio* WVBorderKY

-2.431**
(1.002)

PriceRatio* WVBorderVA

-0.310
(0.479)

PriceRatio* WVBorderMD

-0.783
(0.549)

PriceRatio* WVBorderPA

0.173
(0.620)

Per Capita Non-Food Personal Income

-0.079
(0.132)

-0.093
(0.134)

-0.078
(0.132)

-0.093
(0.134)

Unemployment Rate

0.000
(0.001)

0.000
(0.001)

0.000
(0.001)

0.000
(0.001)

Proportion of Population Over the Age of 65

-0.024**
(0.012)

-0.025**
(0.012)

-0.024**
(0.012)

-0.025**
(0.012)

Proportion of the Population That Is Male

-0.017
(0.016)

-0.017
(0.016)

-0.016
(0.016)

-0.017
(0.016)

Proportion of the Population That is Nonwhite

-0.002
(0.016)

-0.002
(0.016)

-0.003
(0.016)

-0.002
(0.016)

1.616***
(0.054)
0.29
970

1.945***
(0.071)
0.30
970

1.601***
1.621***
(0.054)
(0.055)
2
0.30
0.29
R:
970
970
Sample size:
a
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Within R2 is reported.
*
Indicate 10 percent significance level.
**
Indicate 5 percent significance levels.
***
Indicate 1 percent significance levels.

Constant
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Table 6. Estimation Resultsa
(spatial error model with county and year fixed effects)
Variable
WVBorder*Post-1989

(1)
-0.009
(0.693)

(2)

WVBorderOH*Post-1989

-0.021
(0.997)

WVBorderKY*Post-1989

-0.185***
(4.465)

WVBorderVA*Post-1989

-0.035*
(1.755)

WVBorderMD*Post-1989

-0.019
(0.866)

WVBorderPA*Post-1989

0.073***
(2.838)

(3)

(4)

-0.184
(0.760)

County Relative Price Ratio
PriceRatio* WVBorderOH

-0.358
(1.014)

PriceRatio* WVBorderKY

-3.067***
(4.355)

PriceRatio* WVBorderVA

-0.666*
(1.897)

PriceRatio* WVBorderMD

0.296
(0.803)

PriceRatio* WVBorderPA

1.217***
(2.831)

Per Capita Non-Food Personal Income

-0.020
(0.365)

-0.016
(0.301)

-0.019
(0.339)

-0.019
(0.364)

Unemployment Rate

-0.001
(0.469)

-0.001
(0.576)

-0.001
(0.443)

-0.001
(0.523)

Proportion of Population Over the Age of 65

-0.014**
(2.151)

-0.018**
(2.883)

-0.014**
(2.127)

-0.018***
(2.856)

-0.048***
(2.886)

-0.059***
(3.609)

-0.0048***
(2.882)

-0.058***
(3.548)

-0.0020
(1.436)

-0.027*
(1.853)

-0.020
(1.431)

-0.067*
(1.877)

0.018
(0.421
0.804
R2:
931
Sample size:
a
Absolute value of t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
*
Indicate 10 percent significance level.
**
Indicate 5 percent significance levels.
***
Indicate 1 percent significance levels.

-0.019
(0.441)
0.812
931

0.016
(0.374)
0.804
931

-0.019
(0.441)

Proportion of the Population That Is Male
Proportion of the Population That is Nonwhite
Spatial Autocorrelation
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0.812
931
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